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Abstract 
Imagining a counterfactual world using conditionals (e.g. If Joanne had remembered her 
umbrella…) is common in everyday language. However, such utterances are likely to involve 
fairly complex reasoning processes to represent both the explicit hypothetical conjecture and 
its implied factual meaning. Online research into these mechanisms has so far been limited. 
The present paper describes two eye movement studies that investigated the time-course with 
which comprehenders can set up and access factual inferences based on a realistic 
counterfactual context. Adult participants were eye-tracked while they read short narratives, in 
which a context sentence set up a counterfactual world (If…then…) and a subsequent critical 
sentence described an event that was either consistent or inconsistent with the implied factual 
world. A factual consistent condition (Because… then…) was included as a baseline of normal 
contextual integration. Results showed that within a counterfactual scenario, readers quickly 
inferred the implied factual meaning of the discourse. However, initial processing of the 
critical word led to clear, but distinct, anomaly detection responses for both contextually 
inconsistent and consistent conditions. These results provide evidence that readers can rapidly 
make a factual inference from a preceding counterfactual context, despite maintaining access to 
both counterfactual and factual interpretations of events.  
 
Key Words: Counterfactuals, indicative conditionals, eye movements, discourse processing 
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Introduction 
Understanding a counterfactual scenario, a hypothetical scenario that is counter to reality or 
false, involves an understanding of at least two possibilities: the explicit conjecture and its 
implied meaning (Byrne & Tasso, 1999; Fauconnier, 1994). For example, the counterfactual 
utterance, If Victoria had told the truth she wouldn’t have been in trouble with her boss, invites 
the comprehender to represent the hypothetical possibility that Victoria told the truth and was 
not in trouble with her boss. However, it also implies the facts, that in reality Victoria did not 
tell the truth and therefore was in trouble with her boss. Utterances such as this occur 
frequently in everyday conversations and do not appear difficult for healthy adults to make 
sense of. Indeed, even children respond correctly to counterfactual questions of the form, “If… 
then…”, from around the age of four years old (Riggs, Peterson, Robinson, & Mitchell, 1998). 
Interestingly, children’s success at counterfactual reasoning is also strongly correlated with the 
development of executive functions, which alludes to the involvement of complex reasoning 
abilities, particularly high-level language and inhibitory control (Beck, Riggs, & Gorniak, 
2010). As such, the current paper employs a highly-sensitive eye-tracking analysis to identify 
the sophisticated cognitive processes that underlie adults’ counterfactual reasoning. 
 Theoretical speculations about how counterfactual worlds are constructed and 
represented in the mind typically involve the use of ‘mental spaces’ (e.g. Fauconnier, 1985; 
1997) and are mostly supported by offline evidence that counterfactuals elicit a dual meaning, 
involving the counterfactual and factual representations (Byrne, 2002; 2005; Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 2002; Thompson & Byrne, 2002). The availability and exact relationship between these 
multiple representations remains under debate, with some recent models supporting the 
existence of multiple representations for counterfactuals and proposing that reasoners must 
keep track of the epistemic nature of both representations during comprehension (Byrne, 2005; 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; 2002)1. In contrast, others argue that people only construct one 
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mental model at a time (the ‘singularity principle’, see Evans, Over, & Handley, 2005; Evans 
& Over, 2004). 
Despite a great deal of research on reasoning with conditionals such as the one above 
(e.g. Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2009; Kahneman & Miller, 1986), the issue of how 
counterfactual scenarios are represented online during comprehension has only recently begun 
to attract research interest. Some of these studies have examined how conditionals, including 
counterfactual conditionals, are set up (e.g. Haigh & Stewart, in press; Stewart, Haigh, & 
Connell, 2010; Santamaría, Espino, & Byrne, 2005; Stewart, Haigh, & Kidd, 2009), while 
others have focussed on the mechanisms involved in anticipating or integrating the 
consequences of a counterfactual world (Ferguson & Sanford, 2008; Ferguson, Scheepers, & 
Sanford, 2010; Ferguson, Sanford, & Leuthold, 2008; de Vega, Urrutia, & Riffo, 2007). The 
current experiment will develop this work, looking at how the consequences of a 
counterfactual world are processed online. 
Ferguson and colleagues investigated the comprehension of reality-violating 
counterfactuals such as, “If cats were vegetarians…”, and particularly how comprehenders 
make sense of a continuation that draws reference to this counterfactual world, as in, “Families 
could feed their cat a bowl of carrots…”. Ferguson and Sanford (2008; see also Ferguson et al., 
2008) used an eye-tracked reading task to examine the time course with which a counterfactual 
consequence is integrated into an unfolding discourse. Here, participants read short passages 
that crossed real-world (e.g. “If cats are hungry…”) and counterfactual-world (e.g. “If cats 
were vegetarians…”) contexts with appropriate real-world (feeding the cat fish) and 
counterfactual-world (feeding the cat carrots) continuations. Results showed that readers can 
rapidly accommodate a novel counterfactual world, leading to a reversal of typical real-world 
anomaly detection effects when that information has been presented within an appropriate 
counterfactual context. In other words, “If cats were vegetarians… feed them a bowl of 
carrots” led to longer reading times and increased regressions out compared to “If cats were 
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vegetarians… feed them a bowl of fish”. Complementary effects were found in Ferguson et al. 
(2010; Experiment 1) who used a visual world paradigm task to examine the build up of 
expectations within the same counterfactual contexts. In this experiment, participants listened 
to auditory scenarios, crossing real-world and counterfactual-world information. Participants’ 
eye movements around a concurrent visual scene (depicting, among other things, a fish and 
some carrots) were monitored and time-locked to the onset of the disambiguating word (“fish” 
or “carrots”). Under these conditions, listeners anticipated reference to the contextually 
appropriate real-world or counterfactual-world objects at the same time point- 200ms before 
the auditory onset of “fish” or “carrots”. Taken together, these results suggest that 
comprehenders are promptly able to construct a representation of a novel counterfactual world 
and use relevant information to predict subsequent events in the discourse. However, these 
studies also demonstrated that successful counterfactual reasoning is subject to interference 
from participants’ own knowledge of reality, as continuations that violated real-world 
assumptions (i.e. cats eating carrots) led to disruptions during the early stages of critical word 
integration, regardless of a preceding counterfactual context.  
To date, it remains unclear whether the early interference from real-world knowledge 
revealed in these studies was simply due to the counterfactual impossibilities that were 
employed. Thus, it could be that the initial disruption during integration was driven by 
participants’ familiarity with established real-world norms compared to the novelty of the 
counterfactual alternative. On the other hand, it may be that this process of grounding 
incoming information in real-world knowledge is an integral part of comprehending 
counterfactuals generally, including counterfactual possibilities (see Byrne, 2005) that do not 
violate real-world assumptions. This question will be addressed directly here as we examine 
the processing of counterfactuals that do not violate reality. Consideration of this issue is 
particularly timely given recent evidence that readers evaluate the probability of a 
counterfactual scenario as they are reading, relating incoming information to their contextual 
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knowledge of the facts (see Stewart et al., 2010; Stewart et al., 2009).  
In the current experiments, participants were eye-tracked while they read short 
narratives in which a counterfactual context set up a realistic hypothetical situation, and a 
subsequent critical sentence drew reference to the consequence of this event2 (see (1)).  
 
(1) If Andy had revised diligently, he would have passed the exam first time round.  Now 
Andy was preparing to celebrate over the Summer holidays. 
 
In this example, a hypothetical scenario is described in which Andy revised diligently and 
passed his exam first time around. However, readers should make the inference from this 
counterfactual context that in fact, Andy did not revise diligently and hence did not pass his 
exam first time around. As such, his reported actions in the critical sentence (i.e. celebrating) 
are inconsistent with the context’s meaning3. Using scenarios like this, the current paper will 
assess (i) the speed with which readers can infer the actual state of affairs from a counterfactual 
utterance, and (ii) whether they continue to suffer interference from the alternative 
interpretation during integration of realistic counterfactual situations. Passages depicting a 
factual scenario (established with the conjunction, “because”) were included as a baseline of 
normal contextual integration. 
 Based on existing eye-tracking literature, it is expected that any difficulty integrating 
the critical word will be reflected in longer reading times and higher incidence of regressive 
eye movements (e.g. Braze, Shankweiler, Ni, & Palumbo, 2002; Ni, Fodor, Crain & 
Shankweiler, 1998; Rayner, Warren, Juhasz, & Liversedge, 2004). Therefore, we can make the 
following predictions. If readers have already established a full representation of the implied 
factual scenario, based on the preceding counterfactual context, then some processing difficulty 
should be revealed early on when readers encounter an inconsistent critical word (compared to 
a consistent continuation, such as ‘resit’). Evidence for this inconsistency detection may be 
Eye movements and counterfactuals 
8 
elicited immediately in reading (i.e. increased reading times on the critical word), or at some 
later point (e.g. in a post-critical region). In contrast, if readers continue to represent the 
hypothetical counterfactual scenario rather than inferring its implied factual meaning, they are 
likely to suffer a delay in responding to a contextually inappropriate critical word. Such a delay 
might have the effect of eliciting early anomaly detection responses for consistent, rather than 
inconsistent, critical words (as seen in Ferguson & Sanford, 2008), or simply delaying the 
detection of inconsistent information until further downstream. Indeed, a lack of any 
interference would provide strong support for de Vega et al. (2007)’s update canceling 
hypothesis, which predicts that while a counterfactual scenario is briefly represented, access to 
information within it is suppressed at sentence wrap-up. 
Importantly, it is hoped that the current study will inform on the temporal course of the 
dual representations involved in understanding a counterfactual scenario. In other words, do 
factual and counterfactual representations influence comprehension simultaneously or as part 
of a sequential two-stage process? Examining eye movements during reading provides an ideal 
way to tackle this issue for many reasons. First, tracking eye movements offers an online tool 
to study natural reading, as opposed to self-paced or automated word-by-word reading, with 
millisecond accuracy. Secondly, eye movement data can be broken down into consecutive 
regions for analysis and examined using a variety of reading behaviour measures, including 
early and late influences on fixations and regressions. Further, it is possible to examine 
whether such effects emerge at the critical word itself, or later in a ‘spill-over’ region. These 
measures have been integral to psycholinguistic research for over 30 years (see Rayner, 1998; 
2009), meaning that a great deal is known about different eye movement patterns and the 
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Participants 
Thirty six (22 females) native English speakers were recruited from the student population at 
the University of Kent. All had vision that they reported to be normal or corrected to normal 
(glasses or contact lenses) and none were dyslexic. The mean age was 20.3. 
 
Materials and Design 
Twenty four experimental items were created as in Table 1. Each item consisted of two 
sentences: Sentence one introduced a factual (“Because…”) or a realistic counterfactual 
(“If…”) scenario. The second sentence contained a continuation of this theme (“…Joanne’s 
hair was dry/ wet…”), where the critical word was either consistent or inconsistent with the 
preceding context. Note that within a counterfactual context, a consistent continuation is at 
odds with the hypothetical world described in sentence 1, and vice versa for inconsistent 
counterfactual continuations. This resulted in a 1-factor within-subjects design with three 
levels (factual-consistent, counterfactual-consistent and counterfactual-inconsistent).  
 
“(Table 1 about here please)” 
 
The critical nouns were matched across conditions for length and frequency (using the 
British National Corpus) and no significant differences were found (All ts < 1). The nouns in 
the factual consistent and counterfactual inconsistent conditions averaged 6.83 (SD = 2.33) 
characters in length and a median frequency of 2230, while the nouns in the counterfactual 
consistent condition averaged 7.17 (SD = 2.26) characters in length and a median frequency of 
2400. Hence, any difference in reading times between conditions should not to be due to 
discrepancies in length or frequency of the nouns. 
Three presentation lists were then created, with each list containing twenty-four 
experimental items, eight in each of the three conditions. The twenty-four experimental items 
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in each list were interspersed randomly among 79 unrelated filler sentences to create a single 
random order and each subject only saw each target sentence once, in one of the three 
conditions. Twelve participants were randomly assigned to read each list. Comprehension 
questions followed half of the experimental (i.e., 12) and 40 of the filler trials. Participants did 




Participants’ gaze location and movement from the right eye was recorded using an EyeLink 
1000 eye-tracker (viewing was binocular). All sentences were presented in size 14 Arial font 
style on a VDU screen, 60cm from the participants’ eyes. 
Prior to the experiment, the procedure was explained and participants were instructed to 
read at their normal rate. Participants were seated at the eye-tracker and a chin rest was used to 
stabilize participants’ head position. The eye-tracker was calibrated using a series of nine fixed 
targets distributed across the display to establish the correlation between x/ y voltages and 
screen position. Before each sentence, participants performed a drift correction using a central 
fixation point, then fixated a marker at the top left of the screen- where the first character of the 
text would be displayed. Once this calibration check was completed accurately, the 
experimenter advanced the screen to display the next item. Adjustments to the calibration were 
made whenever necessary. After reading each sentence, participants clicked a button on the 
mouse that either led to the presentation of a comprehension question (after 50% of trials) or 
the next trial.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Methods of Analysis 
The experimental passages were divided into six regions for analysis, as shown in Table 1. 
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Region 4 (critical) consisted of the consistent or inconsistent noun.  
An automatic procedure pooled fixations shorter than 80ms with larger adjacent 
fixations, excluded fixations shorter than 40ms that were not within three characters of another 
fixation and truncated fixations longer than 1200ms. Trials where two or more adjacent regions 
had zero first-pass reading times were removed, which accounted for less than 3% of the data 
reported here. 
Three early measures of language processing are reported here. First fixation duration 
is the duration of the first fixation in a region before going past that region (either a single 
fixation, or the first of multiple fixations). First-pass reading time is the sum of the duration of 
fixations made on first entering a region of text until an eye-movement exits the region to 
either the left or right. First-pass regressions out is the sum of regressive saccades made from 
the current most rightward fixation with a region of text, indicating the degree to which left to 
right movement was disrupted during the first sweep of the eyes through a region of text. 
These early measures provide an indication of the difficulty experienced when participants 
initially process a region of text. We also analysed two later measures. Total reading time is 
the sum duration of all fixations made within a region and provides an indication of the overall 
amount of time spent processing text in that region. Finally, regressions in inform us on the % 
of regressive movements from the right into each region and consequently provides details of 
the regions of text that readers need to revisit in order to make sense of a piece of text. 
Table 2 displays mean values for each measure in each condition and region. 
 
“(Table 2 about here please)” 
 
The eye-movement data for each region was analysed using a within subjects 1-way 
ANOVA (factual consistent vs. counterfactual consistent vs. counterfactual inconsistent), 
allowing generalization to participants (F1) and items (F2). Post-hoc, Bonferonni comparisons 
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were used to examine the nature of significant effects. Given that the length of regions 1 and 2 
differed naturally between factual and counterfactual contexts (i.e. “Because Joanne had 
remembered her umbrella, she had avoided the rain.” versus “If Joanne had remembered her 
umbrella, she would have avoided the rain.”), statistical analysis of reading time measures 
focused on the target sentence (but see Table 2 for means data).   
 
First fixation: Statistical analyses revealed a significant difference between conditions in the 
critical region (“dry”/ “wet”; see Figure 1) [F1(2,34) = 3.93, p < 0.03; F2(2, 22) = 5.35, p < 
0.01]. Further analyses using Bonferroni comparisons showed that first fixation durations were 
significantly longer in the counterfactual consistent condition compared to both the factual 
consistent (t1(35) = 2.56, p < 0.02; t2(23) = 3.34, p < 0.005) and counterfactual inconsistent 
(t1(35) = 2.54, p < 0.02; t2(23) = 2.13, p < 0.05) conditions, which did not differ from each 
other (ts < 0.94).  
There were no significant effects at the post-critical or wrap-up regions [All Fs < 2.5]. 
 
First-pass Reading time: As with the first fixations data, a significant effect of condition was 
detected in the critical region [F1(2,34) = 3.8, p < 0.03; F2(2, 22) = 4.39, p < 0.03] (See Figure 
1). Once again, planned contrasts revealed longer first-pass reading times in the counterfactual 
consistent condition compared to either the factual consistent (t1(35) = 2.3, p < 0.03; t2(23) = 
2.5, p < 0.02) or counterfactual inconsistent (t1(35) = 2.6, p < 0.01; t2(23) = 2.9, p < 0.008) 
conditions. Factual consistent and counterfactual inconsistent conditions did not differ in this 
region (ts < 1.06).  
Taken together, results from these two early reading measures (first fixation and first-
pass reading time), showing increased reading times for counterfactual consistent compared to 
both factual consistent and counterfactual inconsistent critical words, may suggest that readers 
have not immediately noticed the anomalous event in the counterfactual inconsistent condition. 
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Thus, it is possible that they have processed the incoming information as though the context 
had been presented factually, as evidenced by the anomaly detection response (i.e. longer 
reading times) for counterfactual consistent continuations. This early interference is 
comparable to that reported in Ferguson and Sanford (2008), where initial reading time 
responses on the critical word were influenced by readers’ own knowledge of reality, despite a 
preceding fictional counterfactual-world context. 
 No significant effects emerged during the post-critical and wrap-up regions [Fs < 0.6]. 
 
“(Figure 1 about here please)” 
 
First-pass regressions out: Figure 2 plots the mean first-pass regressions out for each region 
and condition as the discourse progressed. As is apparent in this figure, no significant 
differences were found between conditions prior to the critical word onset [All Fs < 0.29]. 
However, during the critical region a significant difference emerged [F1(2, 34) = 4.05, p = 
0.03; F2 (2, 22) = 4.6, p < 0.02]. This difference reflected increased incidence of regressive eye 
movements in the counterfactual inconsistent condition compared to both the factual consistent 
(t1(35) = 2.86, p < 0.007; t2(23) = 2.75, p < 0.01) and the counterfactual consistent (t1(35) = 
2.09, p < 0.04; t2(23) = 2.94, p < 0.007) conditions. Here, the two consistent conditions did not 
differ from one another (factual vs. counterfactual; ts < 0.81). This suggests that immediately 
upon encountering a contextually inconsistent word (i.e. inconsistent within a counterfactual 
context), readers detected a processing difficulty that required them to regress back in the text.  
This effect explains the reduced reading times on earlier reading measures (detailed above) and 
demonstrates that participants have actually detected the inconsistent consequence of the 
counterfactual discourse immediately upon encountering the critical word, thus leading to 
shorter initial reading times prior to regressing back. As such, it is clearly not the case that 
readers were simply ignorant to the counterfactual status of the preceding context. Importantly, 
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within a counterfactual consistent scenario, readers did not show increased incidence of 
regressions back in the text, suggesting that the early increased reading time was sufficient to 
fully integrate the critical word into their representation of events. 
 The difference between conditions disappeared during the post-critical region [Fs < 
1.93], but re-emerged by items (marginal by participants) during the sentence wrap-up 
[F1(2,34) = 1.98, p = 0.1; F2(2, 22) = 8.5, p < 0.002]. As in the critical region, this difference 
was characterised by increased regressive eye movements following a counterfactual 
inconsistent continuation compared to either a factual consistent (t1(35) = 1.86, p = 0.07; t2(23) 
= 2.42, p < 0.02) or a counterfactual consistent (t1(35) = 1.57, p = 0.12; t2(23) = 3.56, p < 
0.002) continuation, which did not differ from one another (ts < 0.68). This effect provides 
further evidence that readers have detected and responded to an anomaly in inconsistent 
counterfactual continuations rather than consistent counterfactual continuations. 
 
“(Figure 2 about here please)” 
 
Total reading times: At the critical region, statistical analyses revealed a significant difference 
(marginal by items) in total reading times between the three conditions [F1(2,34) = 3.78, p < 
0.03; F2(2, 22) = 2.59, p = 0.09] (see Figure 1). This difference reflected shorter total reading 
times on factually consistent critical words compared to both counterfactually consistent 
(t1(35) = 2.16, p < 0.04; t2(23) = 2.1, p < 0.05) and counterfactually inconsistent (t1(35) = 2.39, 
p < 0.02; t2(23) = 1.71, p = 0.1) critical words. These counterfactual conditions did not differ 
from each other (ts < 0.85). 
Thus, this measure of later processing reveals that readers experienced a general 
difficulty at integrating the critical word within a counterfactual scenario, compared to a 
factual scenario. The increased total reading times for the counterfactual consistent condition is 
likely to reflect the initial difficulty that readers experienced when they first encountered the 
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critical word. In contrast, longer total reading times in the counterfactual inconsistent condition 
is likely to be manifest as a result of readers re-reading the critical information in order to make 
sense of the inconsistent event. As such, it seems that the overall difficulty experienced by 
readers in response to counterfactual scenarios represents two distinct sources of processing 
disruption.  
There were no effects at the post-critical or wrap-up regions [All Fs < 0.69]. 
 
Regressions in: Figure 3 shows the mean % of regressions into each region for each of the 
three conditions. A significant effect of condition was found immediately in Region 1 
(“Because/ If Joanne had remembered her umbrella”) [F1(2,34) = 3.33, p < 0.05; F2(2, 22) = 
3.46, p < 0.05]. Planned comparisons revealed that readers were significantly less likely to 
revisit region 1 when the context presented a factual scenario, compared to when the context 
depicted a counterfactual scenario (consistent: t1(35) = 1.99, p < 0.05; t2(23) = 2.15, p < 0.04; 
inconsistent: t1(35) = 2.57, p < 0.01; t2(23) = 2.67, p < 0.01). Interestingly, no significant 
difference was apparent between counterfactual consistent and counterfactual inconsistent 
conditions (ts < 1.1), which suggests that re-reading in this region reflects a general difficulty 
integrating counterfactual scenarios, and not as a result of having detected the inconsistent 
continuation. 
 There were no differences between conditions in region 2 [Fs < 1.43], but clear 
differences re-emerged during the pre-critical region (“By the time she arrived at school, 
Joanne’s hair was”) [F1(2,34) = 5.65, p < 0.008; F2(2, 22) = 3.37, p < 0.05]. More regressions 
were made into this region in the counterfactual inconsistent condition than the factual 
consistent (t1(35) = 3.28, p < 0.002; t2(23) = 1.98, p = 0.06) or counterfactual consistent (t1(35) 
= 2.48, p < 0.02; t2(23) = 2.53, p < 0.02) conditions, which did not differ from each other (ts < 
0.44). This effect provides further evidence that readers detected and responded to the 
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counterfactual inconsistent continuation and returned to the start of the critical sentence in 
order to make sense of the incoherent event. 
No significant effects were found in the remaining regions of analysis [All Fs < 3.03]. 
 
“(Figure 3 about here please)” 
 
Taken together, these results suggest that readers have early access to both factual and 
counterfactual alternatives upon encountering the critical word, which leads to different 
processing and recovery strategies in each condition. Specifically, this study has revealed 
increased initial reading times when the continuation was consistent with the counterfactual 
context, but increased regressions back (coupled with shorter initial reading times) when the 
continuation was inconsistent with the counterfactual context. Importantly, both of these 
reading patterns differ from those shown for factually consistent stories, which suggests that 
understanding counterfactuals is generally more difficult than simple factual utterances.  
However, there is a possible confound in the design of this experiment, which leads to a 
low-level explanation of the early increased reading time elicited in the counterfactual-
consistent condition compared to the factual-consistent or counterfactual-inconsistent 
conditions. Recall that the critical word in a counterfactual-consistent item was different to the 
critical word used in both the factual-consistent and counterfactual-inconsistent items (e.g. 
“wet” vs. “dry”). As stated earlier, we attempted to control for lexical differences by matching 
word length and word frequency across these two critical words, and found no significant 
differences on these measures. However, it is possible that other factors, such as cloze 
probability (see McDonald & Shillcock, 2003), may have influenced reading times outwith the 
experimental manipulations, and thus may have driven the early effects on reading time found 
here. Indeed, previous eye-tracking research has demonstrated that the more predictable a word 
is given the preceding context, the faster it is read (Rayner & Well, 1996), with this 
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predictability effect emerging on both early and late measures of reading. As such, it is 
possible that the critical words used in the counterfactual-consistent condition (e.g. “wet”) 
were simply less predictable in the sentence context (e.g. “By the time she arrived at school, 
Joanne’s hair was”) than the factual-consistent and counterfactual-inconsistent conditions (e.g. 
“dry”). 
In order to test this possibility, a second experiment was conducted that included a 
factual-inconsistent condition as a baseline measure of contextual anomaly detection responses 
in reading. Importantly, this condition included the same critical word as used in the 
counterfactual-consistent condition, thus allowing us to assess whether the early increased 
reading times were simply due to the lexical items used. Additionally, using this fully crossed 
context*consistency design, we aimed to determine how the disruptions to reading observed in 





Thirty six (20 females; mean age 21.7) native English speakers were recruited from the student 
population at the University of Kent. Selection criteria was the same as in Experiment 1, plus 
they had not participated in Experiment 1. 
 
Materials and Design 
The same twenty four experimental items as used in Experiment 1 were used in Experiment 2. 
However, this experiment included one additional experimental condition, a factual 
inconsistent condition to set up a fully crossed 2(factual vs. counterfactual) x2(consistent vs. 
inconsistent) within-subjects design (see Table 3).  
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“(Table 3 about here please)” 
 
One version of each item was assigned to one of four presentation lists, with each list 
containing twenty-four experimental items, six in each of the four conditions. Thus, each 
participant only saw each target sentence once, in one of the four conditions. These 
experimental items were interspersed randomly among the same 79 filler items as in 
Experiment 1. Ten participants were randomly assigned to read each list. As in Experiment 1, 
comprehension questions followed half of the experimental and filler trials. Participants did not 
receive feedback for their responses and all scored at or above 90% accuracy. 
 
Procedure 
Experimental procedures were identical to those used in Experiment 1. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Methods of Analysis 
Each experimental item was divided into six regions for analysis, as described in Experiment 1 
and illustrated in Table 3. Data preparation and measures of language processing were also the 
same as detailed in Experiment 1.  
Table 4 displays mean values for each measure in each condition and region. 
 
“(Table 4 about here please)” 
 
The eye-movement data for each region was analysed using a within subjects 2(context: 
factual vs. counterfactual) x2(consistency: consistent vs. inconsistent) ANOVA, allowing 
generalization to participants (F1) and items (F2).  
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First fixation: At the critical region, a significant interaction between context and consistency 
emerged in first fixation durations [F1(1,35) = 5.21, p < 0.03; F2(1, 23) = 4.16, p < 0.05]. 
Analysis of the simple main effects underlying this interaction revealed that first fixation 
durations were significantly longer in the inconsistent condition compared to the consistent 
condition at the factual context level (t1(35) = 2.78, p < 0.01; t2(23) = 1.89, p = 0.07), but not 
at the counterfactual context level (ts < 0.3). Additionally, first fixations on this critical word 
were significantly longer in the counterfactual-consistent condition compared to the factual-
consistent condition (t1(35) = 1.98, p < 0.05; t2(23) = 2.04, p < 0.05), with no difference 
between factual and counterfactual context levels when the described event was inconsistent 
with the preceding context (ts < 1.49). These data are illustrated in Figure 4. Neither context 
nor consistency emerged as a main effect in this region [Fs < 3.38]. 
 No differences in first fixation duration were found in the remaining regions of analysis 
[All Fs < 0.72]. 
 
“(Figure 4 about here please)” 
 
First-pass Reading time: First-pass reading times at the critical region (see Figure 4) showed a 
main effect of consistency [F1(1,35) = 5.28, p < 0.03; F2(1, 23) = 3.76, p = 0.06]. This main 
effect reflected an overall increased first-pass reading time on the critical word (“dry” or 
“wet”) when that word was inconsistent with the preceding factual/ counterfactual context, 
compared to when it was consistent. However, more interesting was the presence of a 
significant interaction between the two variables [F1(1,35) = 6.68, p < 0.01; F2(1, 23) = 3.71, p 
= 0.07] in this region. Similar to the first fixation data, simple main effects revealed 
significantly longer first-pass reading times when the critical word was inconsistent, compared 
to when it was consistent with a preceding factual context (t1(35) = 3.05, p < 0.004; t2(23) = 
2.11, p < 0.05). In contrast, consistency did not influence first-pass reading times on the 
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critical word within a counterfactual context (ts < 0.27). Further, on this measure, readers 
showed significantly longer reading times in the factual-inconsistent condition compared to the 
counterfactual-inconsistent condition (t1(35) = 2.24, p < 0.03; t2(23) = 1.78, p = 0.09), but no 
difference between factual- and counterfactual-consistent conditions (ts < 0.27). As such, it 
appears that the main effect of consistency was being driven solely by the substantially 
increased first-pass reading times for the factual-inconsistent condition, while reading times 
remained equivalent for the two counterfactual conditions. 
 Taken together, these early reading time measures (first fixation and first-pass reading 
time) indicate that the increased reading times found in Experiment 1 do genuinely reflect 
increased difficulty with integrating the critical word (“dry” or “wet”). This is evidenced by the 
significantly longer reading times in the factual-inconsistent condition compared to the 
counterfactual-consistent condition. It is also interesting to note that in contrast to Experiment 
1, readers here spent as long integrating a counterfactually consistent word as a 
counterfactually inconsistent word, with both showing increased reading times relative to the 
factual-consistent baseline. We will consider the nature of this finding in more depth once all 
measures have been reported. 
No further differences in first-pass reading times were found in the remaining regions 
[All Fs < 3.02]. 
 
First-pass regressions out: Figure 5 illustrates how each condition affected the mean first-pass 
regressions out of each region as the sentence progressed. 
 
“(Figure 5 about here please)” 
 
Similar to the first-pass reading time data, first-pass regressions out of the critical region 
showed both a main effect of consistency [F1(1,35) = 4.3, p < 0.05; F2(1, 23) = 2.66, p = 0.1] 
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and a significant interaction [F1(1,35) = 3.99, p < 0.05; F2(1, 23) = 7.05, p < 0.01]. However, 
on this measure, these effects were being driven by the significantly increased probability of 
making regressions out following a counterfactual-inconsistent item, compared to a 
counterfactual-consistent item (t1(35) = 2.71, p < 0.01; t2(23) = 2.97, p < 0.007) or even a 
factual inconsistent item (t1(35) = 1.56, p = 0.1; t2(23) = 2.35, p < 0.03). None of the 
remaining simple main effect comparisons revealed significant differences (ts < 1.56). 
 The post-critical region revealed a main effect of context [F1(1,35) = 10.31, p < 0.003; 
F2(1, 23) = 5.65, p < 0.03], with increased regressions out following a factual context 
compared to a counterfactual context. Given that no main effect of consistency or 
context*consistency interaction was present here [All Fs < 0.81], we can assert that this 
context effect reflects readers’ sensitivity to the clear anomalies among the factual items, 
which increased their likelihood of regressing back to double-check the context regardless of 
the consistency of the incoming information. 
There were no effects in the wrap-up region [All Fs < 2.87]. 
 
Total reading times: A significant main effect of consistency was found at the pre-critical 
region [F1(1,35) = 9.8, p < 0.004; F2(1, 23) = 5.47, p < 0.03]. This effect was characterised by 
increased total reading times when the target sentence included a contextually inconsistent 
continuation, compared to a contextually consistent continuation.  
At the critical region, statistical tests revealed main effects of both context [F1(1,35) = 
4.01, p < 0.05; F2(1, 23) = 2.45, p = 0.1] and consistency [F1(1,35) = 10.5, p < 0.003; F2(1, 23) 
= 3.77, p = 0.06]. These effects reflected increased overall reading times following a factual 
context compared to a counterfactual context, and increased reading times when the critical 
word was inconsistent with the preceding context compared to when it was consistent. 
However, as with earlier measures, the pattern of results in total reading times was dominated 
by a significant context*consistency interaction [F1(1,35) = 22.2, p < 0.001; F2(1, 23) = 8.86, p 
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< 0.007]. Examining the distribution of reading times in Figure 4, and running simple main 
effects analyses elucidates that this interaction is being driven by significantly longer total 
reading times following a factually inconsistent continuation compared to a factually consistent 
continuation (t1(35) = 5.25, p < 0.001; t2(23) = 2.97, p < 0.007). In contrast, consistency did 
not influence reading times at the counterfactual context level (ts < 1.09). Further, context 
influenced total reading times in opposing directions at each level of consistency, with factual-
inconsistent conditions leading to increased reading times relative to counterfactual-
inconsistent conditions (t1(35) = 4.77, p < 0.001; t2(23) = 3.01, p < 0.007), and counterfactual-
consistent conditions eliciting increased reading times compared to factual consistent 
conditions (t1(35) = 2.31, p < 0.03; t2(23) = 1.78, p = 0.08). 
In the post-critical region, total reading times elicited a main effect of context [F1(1,35) 
= 8.14, p < 0.007; F2(1, 23) = 2.88, p = 0.1]. This effect was similar to that revealed in the 
first-pass regressions out data, where reading times were significantly longer for factual stories 
compared to counterfactual stories. There were no further effects in this post-critical region or 
in the wrap-up region [All Fs < 2.05]. 
 
Regressions in: Figure 6 shows the mean % of regressions into each region for each of the four 
conditions. In the critical region, a main effect of context [F1(1,35) = 4.71, p < 0.04; F2(1, 23) 
= 6.93, p < 0.01] and a main effect of consistency [F1(1,35) = 5.68, p < 0.02; F2(1, 23) = 2.74, 
p = 0.1] was found, which reflected increased likelihood of making a regressive eye movement 
into this region following a factual versus counterfactual context, and increased regressions in 
when this critical word was inconsistent versus consistent with the preceding context. No 
significant interaction was present [Fs < 0.06]. 
 
“(Figure 6 about here please)” 
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No significant effects were found in the other regions of analysis [All Fs < 3.59]. 
 
Overall, the results from Experiment 2 replicate and develop the findings from Experiment 1. 
Importantly, they allow us to reject a low-level explanation of the increased initial reading 
times, since the clear violation in the factual-inconsistent condition led to significantly longer 
reading times compared to the counterfactual-consistent condition, despite involving the same 
critical word. As was found previously, readers here detected the counterfactually inconsistent 
word immediately upon encountering it, as reflected in increased first-pass regressions out 
from this region. However, in this experiment, readers spent longer initial reading time on the 
critical word in both counterfactual conditions compared to the factual-consistent condition. 
This effect contrasts with results from Experiment 1, which showed decreased initial reading 
time for counterfactual-inconsistent compared to counterfactual-consistent conditions. We 
explain this different pattern in terms of readers’ sensitivity to the inclusion of obvious context 
violations (factual-inconsistent condition) in Experiment 2. Such an account is corroborated by 
the increased probability of regressing back in the text following both factual conditions and 
also by the relatively increased reading times for all conditions in Experiment 2 compared to 
Experiment 1. 
As such, we can assert that for counterfactual-consistent sentences, as in Experiment 1, 
readers required longer initial reading time to fully integrate the critical word into their factual 
representation of events. Further, Experiment 2 demonstrates that when readers were aware of 
clear anomalous items among the sentences, they adapted their reading strategy to spend longer 
initial reading time on counterfactual-inconsistent critical words, prior to regressing back in the 
text to make sense of the mismatch. Therefore, these results can be taken as further evidence 
that readers maintain access to both possible interpretations of a counterfactual world. 
 
General Discussion 
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Understanding a counterfactual scenario requires the comprehender to temporarily represent a 
version of the world that is at odds with the implied factual alternative (Fauconnier & Turner, 
2003). However, for such language structures to be successful in everyday situations 
communicators need to be able to rapidly dissociate counterfactual and factual information, 
otherwise these contrasting sources of information would become confounded. That is, 
although the two ‘possible worlds’ are likely to be governed by the same basic constraints (e.g. 
gravity), each represents a distinct model of the world. Reasoners must then keep track of the 
epistemic state of these factual and counterfactual mental representations in order to interpret 
subsequent information appropriately (Byrne, 2005; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). At the 
outset of this paper, we proposed to investigate the time-course with which readers can set up 
and access factual inferences based on a counterfactual context and to examine whether such 
processes suffer interference from the counterfactual situation.  
Results showed that within a counterfactual scenario, initial processing of the critical 
word led to anomaly detection responses for both contextually consistent and inconsistent 
information. These effects were characterized by distinct behavioural responses, as 
counterfactual consistent continuations prompted readers to spend longer during initial reading 
of a critical word, but counterfactual inconsistent continuations elicited a higher incidence of 
first-pass regressions back from that critical word. Indeed, as shown in Experiment 2, readers’ 
sensitivity to anomalous materials in the experiment modulated these effects further and 
prompted readers to increase their initial reading time on the critical word in both 
counterfactual conditions in order to verify the incoming information according to the inferred 
factual representation. However, even under these conditions, readers detected counterfactually 
inconsistent critical words immediately upon encountering them and attempted to recover by 
regressing back in the story. This was not the case for counterfactual-consistent items. Later 
measures of reading provided conclusive evidence that overall, readers favoured the implied 
factual meaning of the discourse, with increased total reading times in both counterfactual 
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conditions relative to the factual-consistent condition, and crucially, increased regressions for 
counterfactual inconsistent continuations compared to consistent ones. Taken together, these 
results demonstrate that readers can rapidly make a factual inference from a preceding 
counterfactual context, despite maintaining access to both counterfactual and factual 
interpretations of events. 
 These results fit well with previous online studies of counterfactual reasoning. 
Importantly, they replicate the rapid access to the factual alternative shown in de Vega et al. 
(2007), but extend this work to demonstrate that readers also maintain access to the 
hypothetical alternative. Such an account has been made previously by Santamaria and 
colleagues (2005), who observed that counterfactual utterances such as, “If it had rained, the 
plants would have bloomed” primed faster comprehension of both negative (i.e. factual; not p 
and not q) and affirmative (i.e. counterfactual; p and q) conjunctions. Moreover, we have 
established that understanding a counterfactual utterance may be more cognitively demanding 
than simply understanding a factual utterance. Evidence for this effect comes from the initial 
difficulty at integrating the critical word and the increased incidence of regressions into the 
antecedent clause region for both counterfactual continuations. Further, the finding from 
Experiment 2 that counterfactual inconsistencies do not elicit as strong anomaly detection 
effects as factual inconsistencies, suggests that representations of counterfactually-implied 
factual scenarios are not as robust as information that has been presented factually. It is 
possible that these effects are due to the increased demands on readers to set up multiple 
representations of the world following a counterfactual context and to evaluate the truth value 
of each, while factual contexts simply prompt the reader to simulate a single factual 
representation. 
The results also offer an interesting comparison with Ferguson and Sanford’s (2008) 
studies of reality-violating counterfactuals. Although readers in all these studies suffered some 
initial interference from the alternative world representation, readers in Ferguson and Sanford 
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eventually favoured a counterfactual-world interpretation of the critical event, while readers in 
the current study favoured a factual-world interpretation of the critical event. These preferences 
were deliberately prompted by the language used in the critical sentence (i.e. modal verbs 
‘could’ and ‘would’ in Ferguson and Sanford, versus factual cues (e.g. ‘That evening…’) used 
here). However, these differing effects raise several questions, including whether readers show 
any interpretation preference prior to encountering a biasing language cue. It would also be 
important to know how quickly these structures can trigger a reader to adopt one interpretation 
over the other and use that as the preferred model for parsing incoming information.  
Since the current data have established that within a counterfactual narrative, the 
counterfactual representation does briefly interfere with readers’ online inferences about the 
implied factual situation (relative to factually consistent sentences), we can also assume that 
comprehenders do not actively suppress access to the hypothetical scenario. Such interference 
was not anticipated by previous research, which has proposed that readers are able to 
temporarily represent the false alternative when this fits with the counterfactual conditional 
framework (Byrne, 1997; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), or that they suppress access to the 
counterfactual events at sentence wrap-up and shift their attention back to the factual events in 
the story (de Vega et al., 2007). Thus, future accounts of counterfactual reasoning would need 
to allow for the fact that comprehenders continue to retain access to both factual and 
counterfactual representations of the world (as first suggested by Santamaria et al., 2005), and 
use these models to integrate incoming information, at least one sentence downstream of the 
counterfactual context. Indeed, it would be intriguing to examine how this effect proceeds over 
time when the constraints of the factual or counterfactual world are continually tested. For 
example, when reading a longer narrative that repeatedly supports the implied factual world, at 
what point does one stop representing the counterfactual world all together (therefore suffering 
no initial interference)? Conversely, if the narrative continues to develop the hypothetical 
counterfactual world, do readers gradually adopt this model as providing the constraints for 
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language comprehension, therefore eliciting anomaly detection responses to factually 
consistent input? 
The data reported here offer new insights into the temporal course of the dual 
representations involved in understanding a counterfactual scenario. Although some models of 
counterfactual reasoning seem to endorse the involvement of multiple representations in some 
form (e.g. Byrne & Tasso, 1999; Fauconnier, 1994), there is currently no consensus on the 
exact time course with which each of these influences language processing. This is largely due 
to a lack of online evidence to examine such effects. Indeed, at face value, Ferguson and 
Sanford’s (2008) previous online studies might be taken as evidence for a sequential 
mechanism, in which integrating the consequences of a counterfactual world suffer initial 
interference from the alternative world. However, these studies examined novel, reality-
violating counterfactual scenarios, which were likely to require readers to make an extra 
inference to test incoming information against the true world. Using realistic counterfactual 
scenarios, the current study clearly demonstrates that incoming information is tested 
simultaneously against both the counterfactual and factual world for inference during the early 
stages of language comprehension. This finding argues against a sequential, two-stage process 
for understanding counterfactual conditional utterances in favour of a rapid, parallel process 
involving both the factual and counterfactual interpretations of events, from which readers can 
select the contextually appropriate continuation using cues from the evolving linguistic input. 
A final interesting point to consider is the relative involvement of information provided 
by the antecedent and the consequent, which set up the counterfactual worlds to be tested here. 
A similar issue has recently been investigated by Stewart et al. (2010), who examined how 
online processing of a conditional statement of the form, If p then q (e.g. If student tuition fees 
rise then applications for university places will fall), is influenced by the conditional 
probability of [q given p], or the combined probability of [p and q]. In three experiments, 
Stewart et al. manipulated the subjective probability of p, q and [q given p] in various everyday 
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conditional statements. Results showed that during processing of the consequent clause, 
readers were sensitive to the probability of both p, and [q given p], meaning that readers do 
evaluate the real-world probability of a conditional statement online. In the current study, we 
examined how readers’ understanding of a counterfactual world influences integration of a 
consequence in a subsequent critical sentence. Looking at the full set of experimental materials 
(see Appendix) shows that these critical consequences did not uniformly relate to the same 
aspect of the counterfactual context. Specifically, some of the critical events referred to 
information from the antecedent (as in (2)), others to the consequent (3) and still others to a 
combination of the two (4). 
 
(2) If Karl had been wearing a jacket, he wouldn’t have minded the long delay.  After 
waiting outside for an hour he now felt cold as he watched the train approach. 
(3) If it had rained this morning Susan would have rushed to get to work.  In the end, Susan 
arrived at work late and her colleagues commented on it. 
(4) If Bill had trained thoroughly, he would have completed this year’s London marathon.  
The following day Bill felt frustrated with his efforts. 
 
As such, an intriguing question for future research is whether consequential information that 
draws upon these different sources (antecedent, consequent or a combination) leads to different 
patterns of online integration. Unfortunately, such a detailed analysis is not possible here since 
the experimental design did not explicitly manipulate this variable. 
In conclusion, when a conditional context depicts a counterfactual scenario (e.g. ‘If 
Andy had revised diligently…’), readers can rapidly make an appropriate inference about the 
factual alternative (that Andy did not revise diligently) and use this to interpret and predict 
subsequent events in the narrative. Importantly, this conjecture is established online during 
discourse comprehension, and represented (at least temporarily) in parallel with the 
Eye movements and counterfactuals 
29 
counterfactual version of events. This finding supports a model of counterfactual reasoning 
where comprehenders have rapid, concurrent access to both factual and counterfactual 
possibilities and use cues from the evolving linguistic input to guide their incremental 
interpretation of events. Finally, these studies have demonstrated that inferring information 
from a counterfactual context may be more cognitively effortful that simply making an 
inference from a factual context. 
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Footnotes 
1 This model predicts that readers can represent the false alternative to a counterfactual 
utterance when that information is true within the counterfactual remit. 
2 Note that in contrast to Ferguson and Sanford (2008), the critical sentence used here 
prompted readers to infer the factual interpretation of the counterfactual context. 
3 Note that this critical word would not be semantically anomalous without the preceding 
context sentence, thus we are examining inferences based on local contextual manipulations 
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Table 1:  


















  Because Joanne had remembered her umbrella,1| she had avoided the rain.2|  By the time she 
  arrived at school Joanne’s hair waspre-critical | drycritical| and somepost-critical | of her friends laughed.wrap-up|
Counterfactual Consistent
  If Joanne had remembered her umbrella,1| she would have avoided the rain.2|  By the time she 
  arrived at school Joanne’s hair waspre-critical | wetcritical| and somepost-critical| of her friends laughed.wrap-up|
Counterfactual Inconsistent
  If Joanne had remembered her umbrella,1| she would have avoided the rain.2|  By the time she 
  arrived at school Joanne’s hair waspre-critical | drycritical| and somepost-critical | of her friends laughed.wrap-up|
Eye movements and counterfactuals 
41 
Table 2:  
Mean eye-movement measures per region, showing standard errors in parentheses (Experiment 
1).  
  
Region 1 Region 2 Pre-critical Critical Post-critical Wrap-up
First fixation (msec)
  Factual Consistent 145 (4.7) 237 (9.3) 240 (8.2) 218 (5.8) 220 (11.0) 206 (8.4)
  Counterfactual Consistent 153 (6.9) 230 (7.3) 224 (7.9) 240 (8.4) 204 (8.8) 221 (7.8)
  Counterfactual Inconsistent 150 (5.4) 227 (6.2) 228 (7.7) 213 (7.2) 227 (8.3) 221 (10.2)
First-pass reading time (msec)
  Factual Consistent 1363 (64.5) 1015 (55.3) 1019 (62.2) 244 (9.4) 253 (18.3) 500 (26.2)
  Counterfactual Consistent 1248 (53.3) 1069 (64.5) 985 (68.0) 277 (13.3) 246 (11.4) 490 (33.5)
  Counterfactual Inconsistent 1200 (66.2) 1098 (67.9) 974 (60.8) 242 (11.1) 260 (13.4) 517 (29.1)
First-pass regressions out (%)
  Factual Consistent 0 (0) 13.1 (3.5) 13.4 (3.8) 7.1 (2.1) 22.5 (5.5) 52.2 (4.4)
  Counterfactual Consistent 0 (0) 16.4 (3.7) 10.4 (2.8) 9.7 (3.1) 14.8 (3.9) 56.1 (6.3)
  Counterfactual Inconsistent 0 (0) 14.6 (3.8) 11.2 (2.4) 21.3 (5.0) 17.9 (4.5) 65.1 (5.9)
Total reading time (msec)
  Factual Consistent 1601 (79.0) 1280 (62.8) 1335 (68.8) 280 (12.6) 312 (20.1) 660 (34.7)
  Counterfactual Consistent 1623 (101.4) 1367 (72.8) 1338 (83.1) 348 (28.1) 315 (19.5) 615 (42.2)
  Counterfactual Inconsistent 1645 (90.8) 1468 (72.0) 1447 (82.0) 332 (20.2) 332 (25.0) 655 (32.2)
Regressions in (%)
  Factual Consistent 35.4 (5.3) 16.2 (3.4) 29.6 (4.0) 12.4 (3.0) 20.7 (4.5) 0 (0)
  Counterfactual Consistent 47.4 (5.4) 11.9 (3.3) 31.9 (4.3) 10.7 (3.2) 20.7 (4.4) 0 (0)
  Counterfactual Inconsistent 53.6 (6.0) 19.0 (3.2) 46.2 (5.2) 20.2 (4.6) 12.5 (3.2) 1.4 (1)
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Table 3:  
















  Because Joanne had remembered her umbrella,1| she had avoided the rain.2|  By the time she 
  arrived at school Joanne’s hair waspre-critical | drycritical| and somepost-critical | of her friends laughed.wrap-up|
Factual Inconsistent
  Because Joanne had remembered her umbrella,1| she had avoided the rain.2|  By the time she 
  arrived at school Joanne’s hair waspre-critical | wetcritical| and somepost-critical| of her friends laughed.wrap-up|
Counterfactual Consistent
  If Joanne had remembered her umbrella,1| she would have avoided the rain.2|  By the time she 
  arrived at school Joanne’s hair waspre-critical | wetcritical| and somepost-critical| of her friends laughed.wrap-up|
Counterfactual Inconsistent
  If Joanne had remembered her umbrella,1| she would have avoided the rain.2|  By the time she 
  arrived at school Joanne’s hair waspre-critical | drycritical| and somepost-critical | of her friends laughed.wrap-up|
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Table 4:  










Region 1 Region 2 Pre-critical Critical Post-critical Wrap-up
First fixation (msec)
  Factual Consistent 146 (5.5) 240 (8.6) 241 (6.6) 224 (6.1) 236 (8.9) 243 (7.4)
  Factual Inconsistent 147 (4.9) 250 (10.1) 252 (11.6) 251 (9) 235 (10.8) 250 (11.3)
  Counterfactual Consistent 157 (6.7) 240 (7.9) 233 (7.6) 239 (7.9) 240 (13) 249 (11.2)
  Counterfactual Inconsistent 160 (6.6) 243 (8) 234 (7.7) 236 (7.7) 235 (6.8) 240 (7.9)
First-pass reading time (msec)
  Factual Consistent 1594 (84.7) 627 (30.6) 981 (51.1) 246 (8.9) 286 (17.6) 515 (34.8)
  Factual Inconsistent 1562 (60.5) 603 (26.8) 1041 (78.9) 289 (12.9) 305 (16.9) 530 (28.5)
  Counterfactual Consistent 1531 (89.8) 656 (35.9) 984 (48.2) 266 (10.3) 266 (15.6) 542 (38.6)
  Counterfactual Inconsistent 1455 (75.9) 664 (42.1) 1079 (69.2) 263 (9) 281 (12.7) 542 (40.6)
First-pass regressions out (%)
  Factual Consistent 0 (0) 15.9 (3) 10.1 (2.6) 18.6 (3.2) 30.9 (4.8) 55.1 (4.8)
  Factual Inconsistent 0 (0) 13.2 (3.1) 8.8 (2.3) 18.5 (2.7) 29.4 (4.2) 62.6 (5)
  Counterfactual Consistent 0 (0) 13.2 (2.5) 12.4 (2) 14.1 (2.6) 21.1 (4.3) 55.1 (5)
  Counterfactual Inconsistent 0 (0) 16.1 (3.2) 7.4 (2) 23.5 (3.5) 17.8 (3.1) 60.7 (3.8)
Total reading time (msec)
  Factual Consistent 1863 (98.4) 733 (33.6) 1310 (56.6) 322 (15.9) 384 (25.9) 576 (38.3)
  Factual Inconsistent 1922 (81.3) 786 (42.7) 1514 (76.6) 443 (23.6) 433 (25.3) 658 (30.9)
  Counterfactual Consistent 1813 (95.9) 775 (53.4) 1299 (51.6) 367 (17.7) 354 (19.7) 658 (47)
  Counterfactual Inconsistent 1743 (96.5) 851 (65.8) 1443 (77.7) 345 (12.8) 368 (20.3) 640 (47.7)
Regressions in (%)
  Factual Consistent 36.7 (4.5) 14.4 (2.3 40.7 (3.7) 19.3 (3.1) 15.5 (2.6) 0.7 (0.7)
  Factual Inconsistent 41.3 (4.7) 13.1 (2.7) 48.7 (4.2) 25.5 (3.1) 23.5 (3.7) 1 (0.7)
  Counterfactual Consistent 38.5 (4.04) 17 (3.1) 38.9 (3.5) 13.6 (2.8) 17.9 (3.1) 0.9 (0.6)
  Counterfactual Inconsistent 38.5 (4.04) 15.6 (3.4) 39.9 (3.1) 18.6 (2.8) 19.1 (2.3) 1.4 (1)
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Appendix 
Experimental items for Experiments 1 and 2. Note that for each of the items below, conditions 
are listed in the order: Factual Consistent, Factual Inconsistent (Experiment 2 only), 
Counterfactual Consistent, and Counterfactual Inconsistent. 
 
1.   
Because it had rained this morning Susan had rushed to get to work. In the end, Susan arrived 
at work early and her colleagues commented on it.   
 
Because it had rained this morning Susan had rushed to get to work. In the end, Susan arrived 
at work late and her colleagues commented on it.   
 
If it had rained this morning Susan would have rushed to get to work.  In the end, Susan 
arrived at work late and her colleagues commented on it.   
 
If it had rained this morning Susan would have rushed to get to work.  In the end, Susan 
arrived at work early and her colleagues commented on it.   
 
2.   
Because Karl had been wearing a jacket, he hadn’t minded the long delay.  After waiting 
outside for an hour he now felt warm as he watched the train approach.   
 
Because Karl had been wearing a jacket, he hadn’t minded the long delay.  After waiting 
outside for an hour he now felt cold as he watched the train approach.   
 
If Karl had been wearing a jacket, he wouldn’t have minded the long delay.  After waiting 
outside for an hour he now felt cold as he watched the train approach.   
 
If Karl had been wearing a jacket, he wouldn’t have minded the long delay.  After waiting 
outside for an hour he now felt warm as he watched the train approach.   
 
3.   
Because Helen had received her first student loan, her bank balance was now in credit.  When 
she checked her bank balance today she was happy with her financial situation.   
 
Because Helen had received her first student loan, her bank balance was now in credit.  When 
she checked her bank balance today she was worried with her financial situation.   
 
If Helen had received her first student loan, her bank balance would now be in credit.  When 
she checked her bank balance today she was worried with her financial situation.   
 
If Helen had received her first student loan, her bank balance would now be in credit.  When 
she checked her bank balance today she was happy with her financial situation.   
 
4.   
Because the flight had been cancelled, all the passengers needed to rearrange their plans.  The 
businessman called his office to say he would arrive late for the meeting.   
 
Because the flight had been cancelled, all the passengers needed to rearrange their plans.  The 
businessman called his office to say he would arrive on-time for the meeting.   
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If the flight had been cancelled, all the passengers would need to rearrange their plans.  The 
businessman called his office to say he would arrive on-time for the meeting.   
 
If the flight had been cancelled, all the passengers would need to rearrange their plans.  The 
businessman called his office to say he would arrive late for the meeting.   
 
5.   
Because Susan had ordered the extra large pizza, she had felt satisfied after her meal.  That 
evening, Susan left the restaurant feeling full and walked home to distract herself.  
 
Because Susan had ordered the extra large pizza, she had felt satisfied after her meal.  That 
evening, Susan left the restaurant feeling hungry and walked home to distract herself.  
 
If Susan had ordered the extra large pizza, she would have felt satisfied after her meal.  That 
evening, Susan left the restaurant feeling hungry and walked home to distract herself.  
 
If Susan had ordered the extra large pizza, she would have felt satisfied after her meal.  That 
evening, Susan left the restaurant feeling full and walked home to distract herself.  
 
6.   
Because Emma had repaid her overdraft, her meeting at the bank had gone well.  The bank 
manager told Emma that her account was in credit and she asked for advice on saving.   
 
Because Emma had repaid her overdraft, her meeting at the bank had gone well.  The bank 
manager told Emma that her account was in debit and she asked for advice on saving.   
 
If Emma had repaid her overdraft, her meeting at the bank would have gone well.  The bank 
manager told Emma that her account was in debit and she asked for advice on saving.   
 
If Emma had repaid her overdraft, her meeting at the bank would have gone well.  The bank 
manager told Emma that her account was in credit and she asked for advice on saving.   
 
7.   
Because Marc had got into Big Brother, he had been on the cover of all the big magazines.  
Back then, Marc was a celebrity but still enjoyed spending time with his friends.   
 
Because Marc had got into Big Brother, he had been on the cover of all the big magazines.  
Back then, Marc was a no-one but still enjoyed spending time with his friends.   
 
If Marc had got into Big Brother, he would have been on the cover of all the big magazines.  
Back then, Marc was a no-one but still enjoyed spending time with his friends.   
 
If Marc had got into Big Brother, he would have been on the cover of all the big magazines.  
Back then, Marc was a celebrity but still enjoyed spending time with his friends.   
 
8.   
Because Victoria had been a fan of operas, her experience at the show was wonderful.  Last 
night Victoria watched La Boheme and felt excited by the beautiful music.   
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Because Victoria had been a fan of operas, her experience at the show was wonderful.  Last 
night Victoria watched La Boheme and felt bored by the beautiful music.   
 
If Victoria had been a fan of operas, her experience at the show would have been wonderful.  
Last night Victoria watched La Boheme and felt bored by the beautiful music.   
 
If Victoria had been a fan of operas, her experience at the show would have been wonderful.  
Last night Victoria watched La Boheme and felt excited by the beautiful music.   
 
9.   
Because Tony had been experienced at public speaking, he had enjoyed the international 
conference.  Yesterday, when Tony gave his talk he felt confident and the audience could tell.   
 
Because Tony had been experienced at public speaking, he had enjoyed the international 
conference.  Yesterday, when Tony gave his talk he felt nervous and the audience could tell.   
 
If Tony had been experienced at public speaking, he would have enjoyed the international 
conference.  Yesterday, when Tony gave his talk he felt nervous and the audience could tell.   
 
If Tony had been experienced at public speaking, he would have enjoyed the international 
conference.  Yesterday, when Tony gave his talk he felt confident and the audience could tell.   
 
10.   
Because there hadn’t been roadworks on the motorway, Bill’s bus had arrived on time.  Bill 
called a friend to say he would be punctual for their planned pub crawl.   
 
Because there hadn’t been roadworks on the motorway, Bill’s bus had arrived on time.  Bill 
called a friend to say he would be delayed for their planned pub crawl.   
 
If there hadn’t been roadworks on the motorway, Bill’s bus would have arrived on time.  Bill 
called a friend to say he would be delayed for their planned pub crawl.   
 
If there hadn’t been roadworks on the motorway, Bill’s bus would have arrived on time.  Bill 
called a friend to say he would be punctual for their planned pub crawl.   
 
11.   
Because Joanne had remembered her umbrella, she had avoided the rain.  By the time she 
arrived at school Joanne’s hair was dry and some of her friends laughed.   
 
Because Joanne had remembered her umbrella, she had avoided the rain.  By the time she 
arrived at school Joanne’s hair was wet and some of her friends laughed.   
 
If Joanne had remembered her umbrella, she would have avoided the rain.  By the time she 
arrived at school Joanne’s hair was wet and some of her friends laughed.   
 
If Joanne had remembered her umbrella, she would have avoided the rain.  By the time she 
arrived at school Joanne’s hair was dry and some of her friends laughed.   
 
12.   
Because Martin is allergic to shellfish, he needs to avoid certain foods.  When Martin eats in a 
restaurant he often chooses chicken and an expensive bottle of wine.   
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Because Martin is allergic to shellfish, he needs to avoid certain foods.  When Martin eats in a 
restaurant he often chooses prawns and an expensive bottle of wine.   
 
If Martin were allergic to shellfish, he would need to avoid certain foods.  When Martin eats in 
a restaurant he often chooses prawns and an expensive bottle of wine.   
 
If Martin were allergic to shellfish, he would need to avoid certain foods.  When Martin eats in 
a restaurant he often chooses chicken and an expensive bottle of wine.   
 
13.  
Because Take That had been performing at Glastonbury, Edward had sold his ticket.  In the 
end, Edward was happy to have missed the festival despite the weather.   
 
Because Take That had been performing at Glastonbury, Edward had sold his ticket.  In the 
end, Edward was happy to have been at the festival despite the weather.   
 
If Take That had been performing at Glastonbury, Edward would have sold his ticket.  In the 
end, Edward was happy to have been at the festival despite the weather.   
 
If Take That had been performing at Glastonbury, Edward would have sold his ticket.  In the 
end, Edward was happy to have missed the festival despite the weather.   
 
14.   
Because Sofia had told the truth she hadn’t been in trouble with her boss.  Now it looked like 
Sofia was going to be promoted and her colleagues were relieved.   
 
Because Sofia had told the truth she hadn’t been in trouble with her boss.  Now it looked like 
Sofia was going to be fired and her colleagues were relieved.   
 
If Sofia had told the truth she wouldn’t have been in trouble with her boss.  Now it looked like 
Sofia was going to be fired and her colleagues were relieved.   
 
If Sofia had told the truth she wouldn’t have been in trouble with her boss.  Now it looked like 
Sofia was going to be promoted and her colleagues were relieved.   
 
15.   
Because the crime had been caught on CCTV, the prosecution had won the court case.  The 
lawyers watched as the accused was imprisoned then discussed the situation with the press.   
 
Because the crime had been caught on CCTV, the prosecution had won the court case.  The 
lawyers watched as the accused was released then discussed the situation with the press.   
 
If the crime had been caught on CCTV, the prosecution would have won the court case.  The 
lawyers watched as the accused was released then discussed the situation with the press.   
 
If the crime had been caught on CCTV, the prosecution would have won the court case.  The 
lawyers watched as the accused was imprisoned then discussed the situation with the press.   
 
16.   
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Because Stephen had been old enough, he had no problems buying alcohol. When Stephen 
went to his local off licence he was allowed to buy anything.   
 
Because Stephen had been old enough, he had no problems buying alcohol. When Stephen 
went to his local off licence he was refused to buy anything.   
 
If Stephen had been old enough, he would have had no problems buying alcohol. When 
Stephen went to his local off licence he was refused to buy anything.   
 
If Stephen had been old enough, he would have had no problems buying alcohol. When 
Stephen went to his local off licence he was allowed to buy anything.   
 
17.   
Because Sally had been an accomplished skier, she hadn’t had an accident.  Now Sally boarded 
the flight home with no problems and hoped to fall asleep quickly.   
 
Because Sally had been an accomplished skier, she hadn’t had an accident.  Now Sally boarded 
the flight home with crutches and hoped to fall asleep quickly.   
 
If Sally had been an accomplished skier, she wouldn’t have had an accident.  Now Sally 
boarded the flight home with crutches and hoped to fall asleep quickly.   
 
If Sally had been an accomplished skier, she wouldn’t have had an accident.  Now Sally 
boarded the flight home with no problems and hoped to fall asleep quickly.   
 
18.   
Because Andy had revised diligently, he had passed the exam first time round.  Now Andy was 
preparing to celebrate over the Summer holidays.  
 
Because Andy had revised diligently, he had passed the exam first time round.  Now Andy was 
preparing to resit over the Summer holidays.  
 
If Andy had revised diligently, he would have passed the exam first time round.  Now Andy 
was preparing to resit over the Summer holidays.  
 
If Andy had revised diligently, he would have passed the exam first time round.  Now Andy 
was preparing to celebrate over the Summer holidays.  
 
19.   
Because Helen had watered her plants every day, they had bloomed throughout the Summer.  
Helen’s neighbours commented that they were impressed with the garden.   
 
Because Helen had watered her plants every day, they had bloomed throughout the Summer.  
Helen’s neighbours commented that they were disppointed with the garden.   
 
If Helen had watered her plants every day, they would have bloomed throughout the Summer.  
Helen’s neighbours commented that they were disappointed with the garden.   
 
If Helen had watered her plants every day, they would have bloomed throughout the Summer.  
Helen’s neighbours commented that they were impressed with the garden.   
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20.   
Because Elaine’s car had passed its MOT, it had been deemed safe to be driven on the roads.  
Last week the police stopped Elaine in her car and were satisfied to let her continue home.   
 
Because Elaine’s car had passed its MOT, it had been deemed safe to be driven on the roads.  
Last week the police stopped Elaine in her car and were unwilling to let her continue home.   
 
If Elaine’s car had passed its MOT, it would have been deemed safe to be driven on the roads.  
Last week the police stopped Elaine in her car and were unwilling to let her continue home.   
 
If Elaine’s car had passed its MOT, it would have been deemed safe to be driven on the roads.  
Last week the police stopped Elaine in her car and were satisfied to let her continue home.   
 
21.   
Because Isobel had been on a diet for the last 6 months, she had lost a lot of weight.  Isobel 
now buys her clothes in a size small but her husband gets upset at the cost.   
 
Because Isobel had been on a diet for the last 6 months, she had lost a lot of weight.  Isobel 
now buys her clothes in a size large but her husband gets upset at the cost.   
 
If Isobel had been on a diet for the last 6 months, she would have lost a lot of weight.  Isobel 
now buys her clothes in a size large but her husband gets upset at the cost.   
 
If Isobel had been on a diet for the last 6 months, she would have lost a lot of weight.  Isobel 
now buys her clothes in a size small but her husband gets upset at the cost.   
 
22.   
Because Alison had received a bonus, she had got very drunk at the office Christmas party.  
The next morning Alison had woken up feeling hungover and looked forward to the festive 
break.   
 
Because Alison had received a bonus, she had got very drunk at the office Christmas party.  
The next morning Alison had woken up feeling refreshed and looked forward to the festive 
break.   
 
If Alison had received a bonus, she would have got very drunk at the office Christmas party.  
The next morning Alison had woken up feeling refreshed and looked forward to the festive 
break.   
 
If Alison had received a bonus, she would have got very drunk at the office Christmas party.  
The next morning Alison had woken up feeling hungover and looked forward to the festive 
break.   
 
23.   
Because Bill had trained thoroughly, he had completed this year’s London marathon.  The 
following day Bill felt delighted with his efforts.   
 
Because Bill had trained thoroughly, he had completed this year’s London marathon.  The 
following day Bill felt frustrated with his efforts.   
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If Bill had trained thoroughly, he would have completed this year’s London marathon.  The 
following day Bill felt frustrated with his efforts.   
 
If Bill had trained thoroughly, he would have completed this year’s London marathon.  The 
following day Bill felt delighted with his efforts.   
 
24.   
Because the racing driver had won the last race, he had won the season’s championship title.  
That evening, the racing driver’s team celebrated with him at the pub.  
 
Because the racing driver had won the last race, he had won the season’s championship title.  
That evening, the racing driver’s team commiserated with him at the pub.  
 
If the racing driver had won the last race, he would have won the season’s championship title.  
That evening, the racing driver’s team commiserated with him at the pub.   
 
If the racing driver had won the last race, he would have won the season’s championship title.  
That evening, the racing driver’s team celebrated with him at the pub.  
 
